Probability and Statistical Reasoning Biases

Groups the phenomena of the psychology atlas whose central finding concerns a systematic error in reasoning about probability, randomness or sample size, following Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman's 1974 heuristics and biases program (the representativeness heuristic) and the broader statistical cognition literature it founded. Belongs here: the Gambler's Fallacy and the Hot-Hand Fallacy, which describe seeing patterns in independent random sequences; the Base Rate Fallacy, the Conjunction Fallacy and Neglect of Probability, which describe ignoring or misweighing a known statistical base rate; Insensitivity to Sample Size, the Hard-Easy Effect and Probability Matching, which describe reasoning that does not track how sample size affects reliability; the Illusory Correlation, the Clustering Illusion, Berkson's Paradox, the Texas Sharpshooter Fallacy, Selection Bias, Survivorship Bias and the Subadditivity Effect, each a documented distortion in how evidence is selected, sampled or read as correlated. A phenomenon whose distortion concerns what is salient or easy to recall rather than a probability calculation is filed under anchoring and availability biases instead; every other decision or judgment bias not yet split into either new subcategory stays under decision-making and judgment biases.